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The combination of U. Although it is too early to calculate the full impact of the U. But despite the economic distress caused by the re-imposition of U. It appears that their strategy is to buy time by persuading Iran to remain in compliance with the JCPOA for another couple of years in the hope that a successor U. Reflecting their deteriorating bilateral relationships with the United States and their relatively close ties with Iran, Russia and China are more openly hostile to the U.

Both have defended Iran in the U.

Containing Iran

Security Council, including on missile issues, and have pledged to maintain and even expand economic relations with Iran despite U. Iranians say they will remain in the JCPOA as long as they receive the economic benefits to which they are entitled under the terms of the agreement. In the meantime, they seem to derive political value from isolating the United States from its traditional partners and from being seen by the international community as showing great restraint and responsibility in the face of extreme provocation by Washington.

The dispute between the United States and Iran is currently at an impasse.


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Despite mounting economic pressures, there are no signs that Iran will give in to U. The situation is not stable. A frustrated Trump administration could provoke Iran to leave the JCPOA in the hope that it would enable the United States to mobilize greater international support for confronting the regime. Or Iranian opponents of the JCPOA and the government of President Hassan Rouhani could finally prevail with their argument that continued nuclear restraint makes little sense in the face of U. While U. But in all scenarios, the United States should make clear that the main purpose of sanctions is to provide leverage for negotiations and not to bring down the Iranian regime.

And a modified approach toward implementing current sanctions—minimizing as much as possible the image of the United States standing alone, threatening its friends as much as Iran—could help build a more collaborative approach to addressing the various dimensions of the Iranian challenge. It should also provide warnings to foreign governments when their companies are engaged in sanctionable activity and give them an opportunity to work with their companies to stop the activity before sanctions are imposed.

And it should extend an olive branch to the Europeans by assuring foreign banks and companies that use INSTEX for humanitarian transactions that they will not be sanctioned, and by allowing U. If Iran decides to leave the JCPOA and rebuild its nuclear program, the United States should ramp up sanctions pressure to induce Tehran to halt its buildup and negotiate significant constraints. Security Council sanctions against Iran. While some countries friendly to Iran can be expected to resist strict enforcement of restored sanctions, snap-back would nonetheless significantly intensify pressures on Iran.

The United States should also seek to diversify the scope of its own sanctions—targeting, for example, the light consumer goods industry—in order to signal to Iran that its coping mechanisms will have a hard time keeping up with evolving pressures. Still, to upgrade its nuclear capacities, Iran will continue to look to foreign suppliers, and it remains an important U. At the same time, a key U. Security Council and JCPOA-mandated procurement channel for all permitted nuclear-related imports and does not pursue illicit nuclear-related imports outside the channel.

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If Iran leaves the JCPOA and starts rebuilding its nuclear program, the United States, as recommended earlier, should support the snap-back of previous Security Council sanctions, which would bring back legally binding prohibitions on the transfer of most nuclear- and ballistic missile-related items to Iran. In these circumstances, the U. Pak , Frank A. Rose , and Strobe Talbott February They may seek to discourage three increasingly threatening stages of Iranian activity. Despite U. But having withdrawn, the Trump administration hardly has the standing to call on Iran to stick by the nuclear deal.

The Europeans have mainly sought to use positive incentives, hoping that INSTEX and other devices will convince the Iranians that remaining in the agreement will serve their economic interests. But the Europeans have also signaled to Iran that its withdrawal could trigger the snap-back of U.

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JCPOA economic dividends were expected to benefit Iranians at large, to empower the reform-minded middle class, and ultimately to cultivate a gradual process of democratization. However, these expectations have not been met. Internally, the human rights situation and socioeconomic conditions have worsened. Disillusionment spread among Iranians, ultimately paving the way to the revolt.

Externally, Iran has pursued its goal of retaining and expanding its regional power with more intransigence. This policy, in turn, has fueled the conflicts in Iraq and Syria and helped escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia and Israel, two important EU partners. In conclusion, trade and rapprochement toward Iran have not set the stage for change. Europe needs to consider that Iran cannot be viewed as a factor of stability in West Asia.

Executive Summary

In Iraq and Syria, Tehran has been viewed as overplaying its hand. The revolt against the regime has ushered in a new chapter in the history of the Islamic Republic. A triple crisis is plaguing the Islamic Republic, covering socioeconomic, political, and environmental dimensions — all of which have acted as interrelated drivers for continuous protests since the revolt.

The lack of socioeconomic mobility is a product of a political economy favoring regime members and loyalists. The economic situation is further exacerbated by the absence of much needed structural reforms. Although U. As can be witnessed from various protest slogans, hardline and moderate factions, as well as the clerical establishment many of whom are reformists , all have been the target of popular rage. According to Iranian and U. The environmental disaster, including water scarcity, is arguably a national security threat.

It has already started to threaten the livelihood of tens of millions of Iranians. Importantly, this triple crisis is set to continue, as its underlying causes are likely to remain unaltered or worsen. This new era in the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran is marked by turmoil and potential instability. Protests with anti-regime slogans continue, blaming the deteriorating political and economic situation on the regime rather than on U.

More of the same is unlikely to avoid chaos and instability. As an indispensable starting point, Europe must first establish a unified Iran policy that is binding to all member states to avoid opportunistic behavior by single countries.

https://riademppreapab.cf Also, it is essential to find a common ground among slightly differing European positions. Despite alienation from the Trump administration, Europe needs to pursue steps toward finding a transatlantic common ground on Iran. Also, it must continue to seek exemptions from U. The EU should utilize its amassed weight in Tehran toward extracting gradual change in its domestic and regional behavior, while highlighting the benefits of such changes to Iran.

Cognizant of the comparative advantages it has in Tehran, the EU should not shy away from introducing conditions for cooperation. Taking a steadfast approach, the EU will present an important driver for Tehran to start changing its behavior. While maintaining dialogue with Iran on regional security, Europe should adopt a dual strategy: 1 guarding Iran against the demonization of its role and 2 asking Iran for constraints in that role.

Europe should differentiate between what Iran views as a deterrence strategy against what many of its neighbors regard as hegemonic ambitions. Europe should not re-create the impression it gave during the revolt, that it favors the regime over society. The EU should avoid alienating large sections of Iranian society, thereby ensuring its long-term reputation and interests in the country.


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  7. For this reason, transparent, detailed IAEA reporting and rapid IAEA responses to new information — including to the data in the archive — remain vital to holding Iran accountable for any nuclear misconduct. Similarly, they lack specificity concerning how quickly the IAEA must respond to new information about nuclear activity.

    As a practical matter, these decisions constitute the prerogative of the IAEA director general, who makes individual judgment calls in each case. Moreover, the reports identified suspicious sites by name, such as Parchin and Lavisan-Shian. A heavy water research reactor would enable Tehran to produce weapons-grade plutonium sufficient for a nuclear warhead. The AP, which Iran signed in December , strengthened the CSA by requiring member states to declare all heavy water-related facilities and activities, including heavy water production plants.

    An Iranian opposition group first brought the site to public attention in May , claiming that it served as a base for a biological weapons center. The agency issued requests to visit the site in February and March , each of which Tehran denied.